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Notes From UN Meeting
Phil Suter (PM/ISP)
9/8/94

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EW
CUN

Following are notes from two meetings I attended in New York yesterday (9/7). The first meeting was with [redacted] and a cast of thousands discussing radios. The second meeting was at the UN Military Advisor's Office, discussing UNAMIR's forces.

Radios for UNAMIR

In addition to the reporting cable on the meeting (USUN 3712), I would add the following:

1. The UN is very much seized with this matter, and looks to its success with radio in Cambodia as a model. [redacted] is also seized, having told Tony Lake at the Ad Hoc meeting that he'll "make it happen".
2. The UN is very definitely not in favor of jamming any existing stations, which they feel would be simply too overtly partisan. Tony Lake seems committed to jam the Hutu hate stations, but it will likely require unilateral U.S. action, with (a few) U.S. personnel doing the deed.
3. The UK contribution of transmitters is from their development funds, so the transfer will be to UNHCR (their law precludes those funds being used for peacekeeping operations). We may have to do the same, depending on where our funding comes from. [redacted] will do what he has to do to make sure both UK and U.S. regulations are followed.
4. It is not clear how the U.S. commitment will be funded, although [redacted] thinks AID will do it - I suggested he speak with [redacted] ASAP. Alternatives include using prior year FMF (a de-ob/re-ob requiring congressional notification), but [redacted] would like to avoid the CN process.
5. As the reporting cable indicates, the U.S. commitment is for the studio/production facilities. [redacted] notion is (assuming OSD Legal concurs) is to pull something out of our PsyOps inventory - or production pipeline - that comes close to the UN's needs, and backfill SOCOM with a contract amendment. DoD has a contract working with [redacted] already. The UN's list of components is purely notional - they'll take anything.
6. It is not clear what the final tab might be. The equipment comes to about \$175K, but that doesn't include putting it together, testing it, shipping it, etc. Final bill will likely be closer to \$500K.

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UNAMIR Force Structure

My meeting in the Military Advisor's office was a one-on-one, and obviously reflects the views of the Secretariat only, and the Military Advisors office specifically.

1. The UN is very concerned about the Rwandan government's plans to introduce 2,000 troops into the southwest, within two weeks as they hear it.
2. The GOR is also expected to ask that the Francophone troops leave Rwanda in the near future.
3. India has offered an infantry battalion for Rwanda. The UN would prefer a battalion of logisticians - their more urgent need, especially if the Brits leave Rwanda, as the UN understands they plan, by December. They have asked New Delhi to consider this alternative, but have not yet heard back from the GOI.
4. The UN is very concerned about Burundi, and is trying to be prepared to split off some UNAMIR troops to a newly mandated mission in Burundi, should the need arise. The Indians could be candidates for such a mission. This, in part, explains why they are not concerned if the total number of UNAMIR troops briefly or temporarily exceeds the 5,000 level authorized by the SC. They would simply inform the SC that they expect this to be temporary only.
5. The UN is not requesting any more Senegalese troops than the 240 who converted from Operation Turquoise (the original thought was that their total deployment might be as many as 800).
6. They confirmed the fact that they have delayed the Tunisian deployment, but claim it's only for a week or so, while they increase logistics/sustainment capabilities on the ground.
7. Kofi Annan and Gen Baril are going to Somalia next week, and may stop in Rwanda briefly.